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How are small firms financed?
Evidence from small business
investment companies
Elijah Brewer III, Hesna Genay,
William E. Jackson III, and
Paula R. Worthington
How do firms and financial
intermediaries decide how to
finance investment projects
undertaken by a firm?  Some
firms fund projects by issuing
equity, others by borrowing
from investors and/or financial intermediaries.
This issue interests researchers and practitio-
ners in corporate finance, as well as public
officials whose policies influence the availabil-
ity of capital and the terms on which capital is
provided to firms.  Since Modiagliani and
Miller’s (1958) seminal work demonstrating
the conditions under which a firm’s value is
not affected by the choice between debt and
equity to finance its activities (capital struc-
ture), research has focused on establishing the
analytical and empirical determinants of a
firm’s capital structure.  Three hypotheses,
which are not mutually exclusive, are offered
to explain the relevance of capital structure.
The asymmetric information hypothesis holds
that managers and other insiders of a firm are
better informed about the current and future
prospects of the firm than outside providers of
capital.  The firm’s capital structure, or financ-
ing policy, is designed to convey this private
information to the capital markets and to mini-
mize any underpricing of the firm’s financial
instruments due to investors’ uncertainty about
the quality of the firm.  The second hypothesis
is based on the differential tax treatment of
equity and debt and implies that firms design
their financial policy to minimize taxes.  In
this article, we focus on the third hypothesis,
which stems from work in contracting theory.
Contracting theory views a firm as a nexus of
contracts among its various stakeholders, such
as management, shareholders, creditors, suppli-
ers, and customers.  From this perspective, the
financing policy of a firm is designed to mini-
mize total contracting costs, including potential
conflicts of interest among the parties (agency
conflicts).1  All of these hypotheses offer pre-
dictions about which types of firms should
issue which types of securities.  Although
numerous studies test these predictions, the
evidence is not conclusive.2
We examine the implications of contract-
ing theory, using a unique, transactions-level
dataset on the investment activities of small
business investment companies (SBICs), which
are private venture capital firms licensed and
regulated by the U.S. Small Business Adminis-
tration (SBA).  The SBIC program was estab-
lished by Congress in 1958 to encourage the
provision of long-term private sector capital,
both debt and equity, to the nation’s small
businesses.  SBICs are private firms but, in
return for accepting some restrictions on the
types of investments they undertake, they are
eligible to receive government subsidies by
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issuing SBA-guaranteed debentures (SBA
leverage).  Our data contain information about
every financing transaction conducted by
SBICs between 1983 and 1992, including char-
acteristics of the small firm receiving funds,
the type of security used (debt, equity, or some
hybrid), and other characteristics of the project
and transaction agreement.  Thus, instead of
using stock data to examine the capital struc-
ture question, we use flow data to consider
each financing transaction separately.  This
permits us to separate the influence of firm,
industry, and project characteristics on the
decision of whether to use debt in a particular
transaction.  Furthermore, the data allow us to
examine the relationship between the charac-
teristics of investors (SBICs) and the types of
securities they purchase.  Hence, we can offer
evidence on how the agency relationships of
SBICs with others affect their investment policy
with small firms.
Overall, our results are consistent with the
predictions of contracting theory.  Our main
finding is that business projects that generate
tangible assets and allow little management
discretion tend to be funded with debt rather
than equity.  This result is consistent with the
view that projects that generate tangible assets
minimize the ability of owner/managers to
shift funds to riskier projects.  We also find
that smaller firms are more likely to obtain
debt than equity financing and that, over the
age range in our sample, the probability of
receiving debt financing increases with age,
though at a decreasing rate.  Characteristics
of the recipient firm’s industry also matter:
Greater growth opportunities and research and
development (R&D) intensity are associated
with a higher probability of nondebt financing.
These results suggest that firms whose value
depends on growth opportunities or industry-
specific information, such as R&D, are less
likely to receive debt financing because the
costs of financial distress are likely to be great-
er for those firms.  We also find that character-
istics of the SBIC doing the funding are impor-
tant:  SBICs that are highly leveraged and affili-
ated with nonbank organizations are more
likely to provide debt financing than other
investment companies.
In the remainder of this article, we discuss
the determinants of capital structure, describe
the data we use, and estimate an empirical
model of security choice.
The determinants of an SBIC’s
security choice
What determines the type of security used
by an SBIC to finance the investment project
of a small firm?  What characteristics of the
project, the small firm, and the SBIC affect
whether the SBIC makes a loan or becomes a
shareholder?
Agency conflicts
According to contracting theory, firms and
their contracts are organized such that the total
contracting costs among stakeholders are mini-
mized.  One of the main contracting costs is
potential conflicts of interest among stakehold-
ers.  In financial contracts, the significant stake-
holders are the management, shareholders, and
creditors of the firm.  Conflicts between manag-
ers and shareholders may arise because the
managers are agents of the shareholders and do
not own 100 percent of the firm’s equity (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Harris and
Raviv, 1990; Stulz, 1990).  Because the manag-
ers own only a fraction of the firm, they capture
only a fraction of the benefits of their effort.
Similarly, if they misuse firm assets, they only
bear a fraction of the cost.  Furthermore, manag-
ers may invest in projects that reduce the value
of the firm but enhance their control over its
resources.  For instance, although it may be
optimal for the investors to liquidate the firm,
managers may choose to continue operations to
enhance their position.
Conflicts between shareholders and credi-
tors may arise because they have different
claims on the firm.  Equity contracts do not
require firms to pay fixed returns to investors
but offer a residual claim on a firm’s cash
flow.  However, debt contracts typically offer
holders a fixed claim over a borrowing firm’s
cash flow.  When a firm finances a project
through debt, the creditors charge an interest
rate that they believe is adequate compensation
for the risk they bear.  Because their claim is
fixed, creditors are concerned about the extent
to which firms invest in excessively risky
projects.  For example, after raising funds from
debtholders, the firm may shift investment
from a lower- to a higher-risk project.  Equity
holders tend to prefer that the firm invest in
profitable but risky projects.  If the project is
successful, the creditors will be paid and the
firm’s shareholders will benefit from its
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firm will default on its debt, and shareholders
will invoke their limited liability status.  In
addition to the asset substitution problem be-
tween shareholders and creditors, shareholders
may choose not to invest in profitable projects
(underinvest) if they believe they would have
to share the returns with creditors.
Investors can design their contracts with
the firm to minimize these potential conflicts
of interest.  To minimize the adverse effects of
asset substitution by shareholders, creditors
can require collateral or place restrictive cove-
nants on the loans they make (see Berger and
Udell, 1990, 1995; and Hooks and Opler,
1994).  Shareholders can limit management’s
discretion with regard to the firm’s resources
by requiring regular payments through debt
(Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990).  Debt can also
force optimal liquidation decisions by giving
creditors the right to liquidate the firm if pay-
ments are not made.  Furthermore, by increas-
ing the equity stake of management, debt can
better align the incentives of management and
shareholders.
Monitoring by investors can also be im-
portant in mitigating agency conflicts.  As
residual claimants, equity holders can become
what Jensen (1989) terms active investors by
getting involved in the day-to-day management
of firms (Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein,
1990a, 1990b, 1991; Pozdena 1991; Berlin,
John, and Saunders, 1993; dos Santos, 1995a,
1995b).  Equity can also mitigate the underin-
vestment problem associated with debt, since
old and new shareholders have the same incen-
tives to invest in profitable projects.  Accord-
ing to contracting theory, the financial policy
of a small firm would depend on the types of
agency conflicts it faces.  Therefore, the char-
acteristics of a firm that are correlated with
agency conflicts would affect how it funds its
projects.  What are those characteristics?
Characteristics of the small firm
Risk of bankruptcy—If a firm operates in a
volatile sector and its cash flows vary a lot, the
likelihood that it may be unable to meet its debt
obligations is high.  On the other hand, the firm’s
income may also be sufficiently high to earn
high returns for its shareholders.  A firm with a
very volatile cash flow is more likely to finance
its projects with equity than debt.
Liquidation value—Even if a firm has a
high probability of bankruptcy, it can finance
its projects with debt if the costs of bankrupt-
cy for creditors are small.  Firms with rela-
tively high levels of tangible assets or assets
that can be liquidated easily would have rela-
tively low ex-post costs of bankruptcy and
ex-ante costs of issuing debt (Williamson,
1988; Schleifer and Vishny, 1992).3  Firms
with high levels of easy-to-monitor tangible
assets and few opportunities to substitute
risky assets will have less conflict between
debtholders and shareholders and a lower cost
of debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  As a
result, we would expect SBICs to provide
more debt to firms with high liquidation value
than to firms with low liquidation value.
Growth opportunities—For firms with
high growth opportunities, the cost of restrict-
ing management’s discretion, thereby the like-
lihood that the firm will not have sufficient
funds to invest in profitable projects, is relatively
high (Stulz, 1990).  Conflicts between share-
holders and creditors over the exercise of growth
options and the underinvestment problem are
also likely to be greater.  Therefore, firms with
high growth opportunities are more likely to
finance their investments with equity than debt.
Profitability—If a firm is profitable, the
risk that it would be unable to meet its debt
obligations is smaller.  Furthermore, the share-
holders of profitable firms may be less likely to
substitute risky projects for safer ones after a
debt contract is written, since they have more
to lose if the project fails.  Therefore, we would
expect profitable firms to finance more of their
projects with debt.4
Organizational form—Shareholders of
corporations and limited partners of firms have
limited liability against losses, whereas general
partners and owners of sole proprietorships have
unlimited liability.  Consequently, shareholder–
creditor conflicts are more likely among corpo-
rations and limited partners than they are for
general partners and sole proprietorships.  Thus,
corporations may be more likely to finance their
projects with equity.
Size—Size and the choice of financing
instrument may be related in several ways.
First, if larger firms are more diversified and
therefore less risky, we would expect them to
issue more debt.  Second, recent work in cor-
porate finance indicates that a positive relation-
ship may exist between firm value and debt
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liquidation value implies high ex-ante firm
value, as well as greater likelihood of issuing
debt.  As a result, to the extent that size is
related to firm value, larger firms are more
likely to issue debt.
Ease of monitoring—If creditors can easi-
ly identify the investment projects of firms,
then the likelihood that shareholders can sub-
stitute risky assets, hence the cost of issuing
debt, would be low.  Furthermore, if providing
equity capital to a firm allows the investor to
get involved in the management of the compa-
ny (for instance, through board representation),
we would expect firms that are otherwise hard
to monitor to be financed with equity.
Characteristics of the SBIC
In addition to the characteristics of a firm,
the characteristics of the investor are likely to
influence what type of financing is used. Because
SBICs are agents in their transactions with
investors who provide funds to them, they face
the same sort of agency conflicts with their
shareholders and creditors as small firms.  There-
fore, the investment policy of SBICs is likely
to be influenced by their characteristics.  Although
the finance literature contains several studies
that examine how the principal–agent relation-
ship between the investors and firms may af-
fect firms’ financing policy, there is little evi-
dence on how firms’ financing policy may be
affected by the principal–agent relationship
between the investors and their financiers.
The results in Brewer and Genay (1994) and
the statistics in table 4 (reviewed below) indi-
cate that there are significant differences between
SBICs that provide debt financing and those
that provide nondebt financing.  However,
because we have no structural model that exam-
ines the effects of multiple agency relationships
of investors on their investment policy, we
include the characteristics of SBICs as control
variables in the following empirical analysis.
SBIC size and age—The venture capital
literature offers some evidence that the agency
relationship between venture capitalists and
their investors may affect the investment strate-
gy of venture capitalists.  Specifically, Gompers
(1995a) suggests that venture capitalists may
encourage a premature initial public offering
(IPO) of a firm to develop their reputation and
improve their ability to market the next venture
fund.  He finds that relatively inexperienced
venture capitalists tend to bring companies to
the IPO market earlier than more experienced
venture capitalists.  Similarly, Lerner (1994)
finds that experienced venture capitalists can
time the IPO market better. If experience of
venture capitalists affects how and when they
realize the returns on their investments, then
experience, as measured by age, of SBICs may
similarly affect  their choice of securities.
The size of SBICs may also influence their
investment strategy.  Sahlman (1990) describes
the extensive involvement of venture capital-
ists in their portfolio companies.  Venture
capitalists sit on the board of directors, are
actively involved in evaluating key managers
and investment and restructuring decisions,
and interact closely with firms’ suppliers and
customers.  Our conversations with the manag-
ers of SBICs indicate that SBICs are similarly
involved with small firms in which they hold
equity stakes.  If these investments require
more investigation and industry expertise, such
activities can be carried out by larger, more
experienced investors at a lower cost (for exam-
ple, due to economies of scale and ability to
attract better managers), reducing the relative
costs of equity financing.  However, size is
determined by other policies of SBICs (such
as financing policy), as well as by investment
policy.  Again, lacking a structural model, we
cannot determine the a priori relationship
between SBIC size and investment policy.
SBA leverage—Many SBICs fund their
activities by issuing SBA-guaranteed deben-
tures, which are long-term securities.  Our
previous research (Brewer, Genay, Jackson,
and Worthington, 1996) suggests that SBA
leverage is more burdensome for SBICs orient-
ed toward equity investments, because lever-
aged SBICs need to generate sufficient cash
flows to make payments on their SBA debt.
Similarly, the U.S. General Accounting Office
(1993) reports that the SBA leverage of SBICs
and their portfolio composition had a signifi-
cant impact on the likelihood that they would
be liquidated.  As a result, efficient asset man-
agement implies that highly leveraged SBICs
should be more likely to make debt invest-
ments than are less leveraged SBICs.
Bank-affiliation of SBICs—The SBIC
program enlarges the investment activities of
banking organizations beyond those typically
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venture capital units.  For example, while
traditional bank-owned venture capital units
can only own up to 5 percent of a firm’s equity,
banks’ SBIC units can own up to 50 percent of
a small firm’s equity.5  By establishing an
SBIC unit, banks reveal their preferences for
making equity investments, which are likely to
complement the loans made by the banks’
credit departments and provide opportunities
for diversification.  In addition, equity invest-
ments may enable these firms to spread the
costs of monitoring and generating information
over several products/services, generate scale
economies in monitoring costs, and participate
in the profits of companies in which they invest,
thus providing compensation for their monitor-
ing activities (Rajan, 1992; Petersen and Rajan,
1993, 1994).  We expect bank-affiliated SBICs
to be more likely to make equity investments.
SBICs’ organizational form—SBICs that
are publicly owned companies or partnerships
with a predetermined lifetime need to raise
funds regularly to finance their investments.
Management of these SBICs may be particu-
larly concerned about the short-term perfor-
mance of the company.  There is some evidence
that concerns about future ability to raise funds
affect the investment strategies of venture
capital firms (Gompers, 1995a).  On the other
hand, as Barry (1994) notes, the captive venture
capital firms may face other constraints in how
they invest their funds.
Profitability of SBICs—If shareholders of
profitable SBICs are less likely to substitute
risky assets in order to transfer wealth from the
SBIC’s creditors to themselves, then we would
expect profitable SBICs to make more debt
investments, all else being equal.
Overview of SBICs and their
investments
Below, we describe our data and provide
an overview of SBICs, the types of investments
they made, and the characteristics of the firms
and projects they financed over the 1983–92
period.  We use data from reports of condition
of SBICs and their investments, provided by
the SBA.  The reports of condition provide
detailed balance-sheet and income statement
information for SBICs over the 1986–91 period.6
The investment files, which cover the 1983–92
period, provide the name, SIC code, total as-
sets, number of employees, and location of the
firms being financed; the dollar amount and
type of financing provided (loans, equity, or
debt with equity features); whether there was
a put option on the equity financing, requiring
the small firm to repurchase its equity in the
future; whether the deal included debt financ-
ing; the interest rate charged; the activity that
was being financed; and variables that indicate
whether the SBIC previously provided financ-
ing to the firm.
We augment the SBA data with informa-
tion from the COMPUSTAT database.  Specif-
ically, we construct variables that describe the
characteristics of the industry (two-digit SIC)
in which sample firms operate, covering the
1986–91 period.  We restrict the firms sampled
from the COMPUSTAT to those with assets
less than $250 million to ensure that we are
measuring the characteristics of smaller firms.
The original files on the investments of the
SBICs have 20,159 observations; however,
many of these observations have no informa-
tion on the size of the small firm.  Restricting
the sample to those transactions for which we
have data from both the SBICs’ reports of
condition and the COMPUSTAT files reduces
the sample size further.  Consequently, we
report results using two samples: one sample
comprises 12,182 transactions that have data
on size of the small businesses; the other com-
prises 5,881 transactions that also have data on
SBIC and industry characteristics.
Figure 1, which is based on data from the
SBA’s Statistical Abstract (1995), shows the
time series of overall SBIC investments since
the program’s inception in 1958.  Having grown
rapidly in the 1960s, SBIC investments declined
in the mid-1970s as SBICs failed and their
assets were liquidated.  Modest recovery
followed the 1974–75 recession, and the 1980s
saw significant growth in SBIC funding as the
industry expanded again (see Gompers, 1994,
for a discussion).  SBIC fundings reached their
local peak in 1988, then declined, reaching a
local trough in 1991.  Thus, the period we
study, 1983–92, covers much of the recent
boom and bust cycle experienced by SBICs.
We note that SBICs were responsible for about
one-sixth of total venture capital financing
over this period.
We wish to emphasize two aspects of
our data.  First, the firms receiving SBIC












Note: SBIC fundings in real terms are obtained by deflating nominal
disbursements by the consumer price index for all items.
Source: U.S. Small Business Administration, Statistical Abstract, 1995
and authors’ calculations.
firms in the United States.  Rather, these are
firms that successfully applied for SBIC
funding.  For example, the 5,392 firms repre-
sented in our sample are, on average, bigger
and more likely to be in the manufacturing or
services sectors than the firms sampled by the
1987 National Survey of Small Business
Finances (NSSBF) (Elliehausen and Wolken,
1995, table 1.1).  Second, though our data
contain excellent information on the flow of
funds going from an SBIC to a small firm in a
particular transaction, they say little about the
recipient firm’s (stock) capital
structure.  This occasionally lim-
its our ability to compare some of
our results with other studies.
In the rest of this section, we
summarize our transactions data,
addressing two principal ques-
tions.  First, which types of firms
received SBIC funding between
1983 and 1992?  Second, are
there any obvious firm or SBIC
characteristics that appear to be
related to whether a debt or non-
debt security is used?
Table 1 shows the distribu-
tion by type of SBIC investments
over the 1983–92 sample period
and the total dollar value of activ-
ity in each investment category,
adjusted for inflation.  Nondebt
securities (equity, debt with equi-
ty features, and mixed issues)
represent a larger fraction of both the number
of financings and the dollar volume of activity
than debt securities.  Among nondebt securi-
ties, equity investments account for the largest
portion of transactions and dollar amounts.  On
average, nondebt financings are larger than
debt financings.  The average nondebt financ-
ing is $271,000, while the average debt financ-
ing is $121,000.  Among nondebt financings,
combinations of equity and debt finance are
larger ($570,100) than equity ($276,800) and
debt with equity features ($184,500) financ-
ings.  Though we recognize that
there may be important differ-
ences between the three catego-
ries labeled nondebt in table 1,
we believe that examining the
simple two-way split between
pure debt transactions and all
other transactions is a useful first
pass at considering the debt-
versus-equity question.  Thus, in
the remainder of this article we
consider only the debt/nondebt
classification.
Table 2 reports the frequency
of debt and nondebt funding, hold-
ing constant firm characteristics
such as size, age, and organiza-
tional form.7  In broad terms, the
table indicates that debt fundings
Summary statistics on SBIC financings, 1983–92
TABLE 1
Total amount
Number of disbursed Mean size
financings ($ millions) ($ thousands)
Debt 4,982 602.8 121.0
Nondebt 7,200 1,951.3 271.0
Equity 4,105 1,136.4 276.8
Debt with equity
features 2,463 454.5 184.5
Equity and debt
with equity features 632 360.3 570.1
Total 12,182 2,554.1 209.7
Notes:  Sample consists of all transactions over the 1983–92 period for
which complete data are available.  All dollar figures are deflated by the
consumer price index for all items.
Source:  Authors’ calculations from data provided by the U.S. Small Busi-
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TABLE 2
Small business characteristics and security choice, 1983–92
(Elliehausen and Wolken, 1995, table 5.5).
Thus, large firms in our SBIC sample probably
do have debt in their capital structures, but
from non-SBIC sources.8
Panel C of table 2 shows how firm age
affects security choice.  In general, SBIC
fundings to young firms are less likely to be
debt than are fundings to older firms.  Among
firms less than one year old, 33.7 percent of
SBIC financings were in the form of debt,
while among firms over 10 years old, the debt
share was 60.0 percent; the dollar share figures
are 14.5 and 39.2 percent, respectively.  For
comparison, we note that the 1987 NSSBF
(Elliehausen and Wolken, 1995, tables 1.1 and
4.5) suggests that the impact of age on loan
usage is nonmonotonic, with the youngest and
the oldest firms less likely to use loans than
middle-aged firms.
As shown in table 2, the smallest firms
accounted for over two-thirds (67.9 percent) of
all funding transactions; however, these firms
received only half (50.4 percent) the dollars
disbursed by SBICs between 1983 and 1992.
Similarly, firms less than one year old accounted
A. Number Debt Nondebt Total number Share of all
of employees (% of financings) (% of financings) of financings financings (%)
1–49 47.9 52.1 8,270 67.9
50–249 28.0 72.0 3,349 27.5
250–499 13.6 86.4 381 3.1
500 and over 17.0 83.0 182 1.5
Debt Nondebt Total number Share of all
B. Legal form (% of financings) (% of financings) of financings financings (%)
Corporation 38.0 62.0 11,258 92.4
Partnership 56.6 43.4 350 2.9
Sole proprietorship 88.3 11.7 574 4.7
Debt Nondebt Total number Share of all
C. Age (% of financings) (% of financings) of financings financings (%)
< 1 year 33.7 66.3 1,437 11.8
1–5 years 35.2 64.8 5,966 49.0
5–10 years 42.0 58.0 2,604 21.4
Over 10 years 60.0 40.0 2,175 17.8
Total number
of financings 4,982 7,200 12,182
Notes:  Sample consists of all transactions over the 1983–92 period for which complete data are available.  Nondebt
financings include equity, debt with equity features, and combinations of equity and debt with equity features.
Source:  Authors’ calculations from data provided by the U.S. Small Business Administration.
by SBICs go to smaller, older firms, while
nondebt fundings go to larger, younger firms.
At first blush, the age effect seems consistent
with contracting theory, while the size effect
does not.  In particular, SBIC fundings to small
firms are more likely to be debt than fundings
to large firms:  47.9 percent of SBIC financ-
ings to the smallest firms, those with fewer
than 50 employees, were in the form of debt,
compared with just 17.0 percent of financings
to the largest firms (over 500 employees) (table
2, panel A).  In dollar shares, the figures are
31.7 percent and 13.4 percent, respectively.  In
contrast, evidence from the 1987 NSSBF indi-
cates that large firms are more likely to have
loans outstanding than smaller firms (Ellie-
hausen and Wolken, 1995, table 4.5), suggest-
ing that we might have expected a higher
percentage of debt fundings going to large
firms than to small firms.  We can resolve the
apparent contradiction between our findings
and contracting theory by noting that the
NSSBF also suggests that larger firms are
somewhat more likely to have other (non-
SBIC) debt outstanding than small firmsFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 9
TABLE 3
Intended use of funds and security choice, 1983–92
A. Intended use of funds, as reported
Debt Nondebt Total number Share of all
(% of financings) (% of financings) of financings financings (%)
Operating capital 39.9 60.1 8,957 73.5
Plant modernization 83.8 16.2 173 1.4
Acquisition of existing
business 24.7 75.3 981 8.1
Consolidation of debts 55.9 44.1 899 7.4
New building or
plant construction 78.0 22.0 100 0.8
Acquisition of
machinery/equipment 59.8 40.2 440 3.6
Land acquisition 90.6 9.4 139 1.1
Marketing activities 9.1 90.9 121 1.0
Research and development 6.8 93.2 326 2.7
Other 39.1 60.9 46 0.4
B. Intended use of funds, by type
Debt Nondebt Total number Share of all
(% of financings) (% of financings) of financings financings (%)
Operating capital 39.9 60.1 8,957 73.5
Transaction-oriented 63.7 36.3 1,751 14.4
Relationship-oriented 19.9 80.1 1,474 12.1
Total number of
financings 4,982 7,200 12,182
Notes:  Sample consists of all transactions over the 1983–92 period for which complete data are available.  Nondebt
financings include equity, debt with equity features, and combinations of equity and debt with equity features.  Transac-
tion-oriented uses include plant modernization, consolidation of debts, new building or plant construction, acquisition of
machinery/equipment, and land acquisition.  Relationship-oriented uses include the acquisition of an existing business,
marketing activities, research and development, and other.
Source: Authors’ calculations from data provided by the U.S. Small Business Administration.
by debt.  Panel B of table 3 groups the uses of
funds into three categories, operating capital,
transaction-oriented uses, and relationship-
oriented uses, along lines suggested by Naka-
mura (1993).  Transaction-oriented uses in-
clude plant modernization, new building or
plant construction, debt consolidation, machinery
acquisition, and land acquisition; relationship-
oriented uses include the acquisition of exist-
ing business, marketing activities, and research
and development.  This grouping reflects our a
priori judgement that relationship-oriented
projects offer greater scope for insider discretion
as to how the assets (funds) are used than trans-
action-oriented projects, which are likely to
require less monitoring and are less subject to
asset substitution problems.  Furthermore, trans-
action-oriented uses may involve the purchase
for 11.8 percent of all SBIC fundings but 19.6
percent of all dollars invested.
Table 3 reports on the relationship be-
tween the intended use of funds and security
choice.  The most important category for in-
tended use of funds is operating capital, which
accounted for 73.5 percent of all financings
and 56.8 percent of dollar investments.  Other
important categories are acquisition of existing
businesses, debt consolidation, acquisition of
machinery, and research and development.
Transactions in which the reported uses of
funds included plant modernization, new build-
ing or plant, acquisition of machinery, and land
acquisition were very likely to be financed by
debt, while those linked to the acquisition of an
existing business, marketing, or research and
development were highly unlikely to be financedECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 10
more likely to involve less profitable, nonbank-
affiliated SBICs.  These patterns suggest the
need to control for intermediary characteristics
in the models we estimate in the next section.
An empirical model of SBICs’
investment decisions
Given the possible relationships we estab-
lished between the type of security an SBIC
uses to fund a firm and the characteristics of
the firm and the SBIC, we relate these charac-
teristics empirically to the probability that an
SBIC invests in a small firm through debt.
We estimate the following probit model of
the probability that the SBIC makes a debt
investment in a small firm:




SBICROA, IND-LIQ, IND-R&D, IND-MV/BV,
IND-INTAN, IND-ROA, IND-SROA) + e,
where SECCHOICE is an indicator variable
that is equal to one if the SBIC makes a debt
financing, zero otherwise; e is a mean 0, vari-
ance s2, normally distributed error term; and
all other variables are defined in table 5.  Because
we do not estimate a structural model of secu-
rity choice and other policies of small firms
and SBICs, we recognize that equation 1 is a
reduced-form equation and that we cannot
interpret the estimated coefficients as struc-
tural ones.  Instead, we interpret the coeffi-
cients of equation 1 as partial correlations that
nonetheless may shed light on the theory of
security choice.
Table 5 summarizes definitions and descrip-
tions of the variables in equation 1.  We in-
clude variables that measure ease of monitor-
ing, ease of asset substitution, firm growth
opportunities, and firm risk, as well as a num-
ber of control variables, such as SBIC charac-
teristics, industry (of the small firm), and year
indicator variables.
Table 5 also summarizes our expectations
regarding the signs of the coefficients on the
variables in equation 1.  The ease of monitor-
ing the small firm and the ease of asset substi-
tution by the small firm are measured by the
firm’s intended use of funds (USETRANS),
organizational form (CORPORATION and
PARTNERSHIP), proximity to its funding
Distribution of fundings by
sector, 1983–92













Notes: Other includes agriculture; mining; construction;
wholesale trade; finance, insurance, and real estate; and
public administration.  All dollar figures are deflated by the
consumer price index for all items.
Source: Authors’ calculations from data provided by the U.S.
Small Business Administration.
of assets that have some liquidation value in
the case of borrower default.  As table 3 shows,
fundings for relationship-oriented uses are
unlikely to be debt, while fundings for transac-
tion-oriented uses are quite likely to be debt.
We note that the sectoral and geographic
distributions of SBIC investments over the
1983–92 period were somewhat concentrated.
The manufacturing, services, and retail trade
sectors accounted for nearly three-fourths
(73.7 percent) of all SBIC investments, with
manufacturing alone accounting for 46.4 per-
cent of all dollars invested under the program
(see figure 2).9  Similarly, the top five states
in SBIC fundings accounted for over half
(51.7 percent) the total dollars disbursed under
the program; these five states (California, Con-
necticut, Massachusetts, New York, and Texas)
accounted for only 20.2 percent of total U.S.
employment growth between 1983 and 1992.
Table 4 offers some evidence that the
SBICs investing in debt securities differ from
those investing in nondebt securities.  On aver-
age, debt transactions involve smaller, older
SBICs that have significantly more SBA lever-
age outstanding than SBICs involved in nondebt
transactions.  Furthermore, debt transactions areFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 11
SBIC (SAMESTATE), the average industry
ratio of research and development expendi-
tures to sales (IND-R&D), and the average
industry ratio of intangible assets to total
assets (IND-INTAN). We expect factors that
increase the ease of monitoring (and decrease
the ease of asset substitution) to enter equation
1 with positive coefficients, that is, to be posi-
tively associated with the probability of using
debt in a given transaction.  Thus, we expect
the coefficient on USETRANS to be positive.
Research and development, marketing, and
acquisition of existing businesses are risky
activities that are difficult to monitor and allow
owners/managers a great deal of discretion
over the disbursement of funds.  On the other
hand, plant modernization, new building or
plant construction, consolidation of debts,
acquisition of machinery, and land acquisition
are activities that generate tangible assets and
allow little management discretion.  Conse-
quently, the agency costs of debt are likely to
be lower; fund suppliers can monitor owners/
managers easily, minimizing their ability to
shift funds to riskier projects.  We expect the
coefficients on CORPORATION and PART-
NERSHIP to be negative, since the limited
liability feature of corporations and limited
partnerships tends to increase the incentives of
owner/managers to substitute risky assets for
safe ones, making debt less attractive to inves-
tors.  We also expect the coefficients on our
research and development vari-
able, IND-R&D, and our intangi-
ble assets variable, IND-INTAN,
to be negative, since firms in
industries with high values of
these variables may be less attrac-
tive to debt investors seeking to
avoid messy monitoring prob-
lems.  Finally, we have no prior
on the sign of the SAMESTATE
coefficient.  If monitoring costs
are fixed per financing and vary
by proximity of the SBIC and the
small firm, and if monitoring
costs do not differ according to
whether debt or nondebt is used,
then the coefficient may be posi-
tive, reflecting the fact that most
debt financings are smaller than
nondebt financings (table 1).
Hence, fixed monitoring costs are
spread out over a larger size deal
when the security choice is nondebt as com-
pared to debt.  However, if monitoring costs do
differ by security type, then the coefficient on
SAMESTATE is ambiguous.
Firm risk and growth opportunities are
measured by firm age (FIRMAGE), firm size
(E1–49), and average industry measures of
profitability (IND-ROA), income volatility
(IND-SROA), liquidity (IND-LIQ), and growth
opportunities (IND-MV/BV).  We expect any-
thing that is positively correlated with risk or
growth opportunities to enter equation 1 with a
negative coefficient, that is, to decrease the prob-
ability that debt is used, other things being
equal.  For example, young firms with little
reputational capital may take on riskier projects
(Diamond, 1991), and younger firms may have
more growth potential than older ones.  Thus,
we expect the coefficient on FIRMAGE to be
positive.  Similarly, small firms are likely to be
less diversified and to have more volatile earn-
ings, implying a negative coefficient on E1–49.
Other bankruptcy risk measures are our profit-
ability and volatility measures, IND-ROA and
IND-SROA, and financial liquidity (IND-LIQ).
We expect the coefficient on IND-ROA to be
positive and that on IND-SROA to be negative.
If IND-LIQ is a measure of a firm’s short-term
ability to meet its debt obligations, then we
would expect it to have a positive coefficient in
equation 1.  However, because firms decide the
amount of financial slack as part of their other




Total assets (million $) 35.40 40.48*
Age (years) 14.43 12.21*
Corporate (% of total) 82.38 69.55*
Bank-affiliated (% of total) 23.48 50.02*
SBA leverage (SBA funds/
   private capital) 1.94 0.99*
Return on assets (at market value) 0.07 0.10*
Number of observations 2,594 3,287
*Indicates differences in means are significant at the 5 percent level.
Notes: The numbers are simple means.  Sample consists of all transac-
tions over the 1986–91 period for which complete data are available.  Bank-
affiliated are SBICs in which banking organizations own at least 10 percent
of equity.  Return on assets is the ratio of unrealized and realized gains to
total assets at market value.
Source: Authors’ calculations from data provided by the U.S. Small
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TABLE 5
Variable definitions and descriptions
Expected sign
in security
Variable Definition choice equation Source
Dependent Variable
SECCHOICE Indicator =1 if debt N.A. SBIC transaction data
transaction, =0 otherwise
Measures of asset substitution
and/or ease of monitoring
USETRANS Indicator =1 if intended use + SBIC transaction data
of funds is transaction-
oriented, =0 otherwise
CORPORATION Indicator =1 if corporation, – SBIC transaction data
=0 otherwise
PARTNERSHIP Indicator =1 if partnership, – SBIC transaction data
=0 otherwise
SAMESTATE Indicator =1 if firm and SBIC ? SBIC transaction data
are in same state, =0 otherwise
IND-INTAN Average industry ratio of – COMPUSTAT
intangible assets to total assets
IND-R&D Average industry ratio – COMPUSTAT
of R&D spending to sales
Measures of firm risk and/or
growth opportunities
FIRMAGE Age of small firm, in years + SBIC transaction data
E1–49 Indicator=1 for firms – SBIC transaction data
with < 50 employees,
=0 otherwise
IND-MV/BV Average industry ratio of market – COMPUSTAT
to book value of assets
IND-ROA Average industry + COMPUSTAT
return on assets (ROA)
IND-SROA Average industry – COMPUSTAT
standard deviation of ROA
IND-LIQ Average industry ratio of + COMPUSTAT
current assets to total assets
Control variables
SBICAGE Age of SBIC, in years ? SBICs’ financial statements
SBICSIZE Natural logarithm of ? SBICs’ financial statements
SBIC total assets
SBICCORP Indicator =1 if SBIC is a ? SBICs’ financial statements
corporation,  =0 otherwise
SBICBANK Indicator=1 if at least – SBICs’ financial statements
10% of SBIC’s equity
is owned by banking
organization, =0 otherwise
SBAPRIV Ratio of SBIC’s SBA leverage to + SBICs’ financial statements
its private invested capital
SBICROA Ratio of realized and unrealized ? SBICs’ financial statements
profits of SBIC to market
value of total assets
Notes: Unless otherwise noted SBIC transaction data cover 1983 to 1992, while SBICs’ financial statements and COM-
PUSTAT data cover 1986 to 1991.  Nondebt financings include equity, debt with equity features, and combinations of equity
and debt with equity features.  COMPUSTAT industry averages are computed as unweighted means over firms with less
than $250 million in assets in a given two-digit SIC industry, using annual data over the 1986–91 period.  IND-SROA is
computed as a nine-year rolling average standard deviation of IND-ROA, using data over the 1978–91 period.
Sources:  Authors’ calculations, U.S. Small Business Administration, and COMPUSTAT.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 13
policies, the relationship between IND-LIQ
and the probability of using debt may depend
on factors affecting firms’ other policies.  For
instance, because IND-LIQ is also a measure
of financial slack, which is most valuable to
firms that have ample profitable projects, it
may also be a measure of growth opportunities.
In that case, we would expect IND-LIQ to have
a negative coefficient in equation 1.  Finally, as
suggested by Gompers (1995b), Barclay and
Smith (1995a, 1995b), and others, we include
the average industry ratio of market value to
book value of assets (IND-MV/BV), which we
expect to enter negatively, since it is a measure
of growth opportunities likely to face the small
firm.
Table 5 also lists our control variables,
which describe characteristics of the funding
SBICs, including age (SBICAGE), size
(SBICSIZE), organizational form (SBIC-
CORP), bank ownership status (SBICBANK),
SBA leverage (SBAPRIV), and profitability
(SBICROA).  We expect SBICBANK to have
a negative coefficient, reflecting bank–affiliated
SBICs’ tendency to make equity
investments.  We also expect
SBAPRIV to enter equation 1 with
a negative coefficient, for the asset–
liability matching reasons outlined
above.  We have no priors on the
signs of the other coefficients.
Empirical results
Tables 6–8 report the coeffi-
cient estimates of the determi-
nants of the probability of debt
usage using pooled cross-section
time-series data.
Small firm characteristics and
security choice
The first panel of results in
table 6 is estimated over the 1983–
92 period, using only the charac-
teristics of small firms (12,182
transactions).  The second panel
of results is estimated over the
period (1986–91), for which we
have data on both firm and SBIC
characteristics (5,881 transac-
tions).  The results in panel A of
table 6 indicate that transaction-
related projects are more likely to
be financed with debt than non-
debt securities.  Thus, nontransac-
tion-oriented projects tend to in-
crease the likelihood of nondebt
financing.  This is consistent with
the idea that projects of firms that
involve intangible assets are more
likely to be financed with equity,
on average, than projects of firms
that produce tangible assets.
The results also suggest that
the age of the small business
positively affects the probability





FIRMAGE 0.0493* 0.0030 0.0191
(FIRMAGE)2 / 100 –0.0560* 0.0051 –0.0217
E1–49 0.5154* 0.0279 0.1997
CORPORATION –0.9991* 0.0734 –0.3871
PARTNERSHIP –0.7373* 0.1007 –0.2857
SAMESTATE 0.2634* 0.0251 0.1021
USETRANS 0.4498* 0.0365 0.1743





FIRMAGE 0.0545* 0.0042 0.0216
(FIRMAGE)2 / 100 –0.0578* 0.0070 –0.0229
E1–49 0.5760* 0.0396 0.2280
CORPORATION –1.6396* 0.1844 –0.6491
PARTNERSHIP –1.4152* 0.2086 –0.5603
SAMESTATE 0.3110* 0.0361 0.1231
USETRANS 0.4271* 0.0548 0.1691
Number of observations 5,881
Log likelihood –3,337.37
aSample is all transactions over the 1983–92 period for which complete
data are available.
bSample is all transactions over the 1986–91 period for which complete
data are available.
*Indicates significance at the 5 percent level.
Notes: The “Marginal prob” column presents the marginal effects of the
right–hand–side variables (X) on the probability of debt, computed at the
mean values of X.  See table 5 for variable definitions.  Sector and year
indicator variables were included but are not reported in the table.
Source: Authors’ calculations from data provided by the U.S. Small
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that the firm will obtain debt financing, but the
marginal impact of age declines as age rises
(positive coefficient on FIRMAGE, negative
on (FIRMAGE)2).  The coefficients on the age
variables imply that the mean effect of raising
the firm’s age by one year is to raise the proba-
bility of debt by about 2.0 percentage points.
This result is in line with contracting theory’s
implication that older firms are more likely to
receive debt than nondebt financing.  Because
younger firms are likely to be riskier and have
greater growth opportunities than older firms,
they are more likely to be financed by non-
debt securities.
The results in table 6 also indicate that the
smallest firms are more likely to obtain debt
than nondebt financing, as the simple frequen-
cies in table 2 showed:  For example, the proba-
bility that funding will be debt is about 20.0
percentage points higher for small firms than for
large firms (50 or more employees).  The simple
frequencies reported in table 2 are consistent
with this:  Both the largest (500 or more em-
ployees) and the next largest (between 250 and
499 employees) firms report very low frequen-
cies of debt financing (17.0 percent and 13.6
percent, respectively), compared with about 48
percent for firms with fewer than 50 employees.
As we discussed earlier, we believe that the
larger firms in our sample are likely to have
debt from other (non-SBIC) sources; hence, our
results are not inconsistent with theories sug-
gesting that larger firms are more likely to ob-
tain debt financing than smaller firms.
A firm’s organizational characteristics
have an important influence on the probability
of debt financing.  Being incorporated raises
the probability of receiving nondebt financing
by 39 percentage points relative to sole propri-
etorships and by about 10 percentage points
relative to partnerships.  An owner/manager
firm has a greater incentive to take on risky
projects if it has limited liability.  Thus, these
firms are more likely to receive
nondebt than debt financings to
minimize the asset substitution
problem.
The results in table 6 also
suggest that firms located in same
state as the SBIC (SAMESTATE)
are more likely to be funded with
debt instruments than firms in
other states; thus we find that
being in the same state raises the
probability of a debt security
being used in a given financing.
Finally, we note that the results in
panel B of table 6 are broadly
consistent with those in panel A
of table 6.  Thus, using the small-
er sample does not affect the
manner in which small firm char-
acteristics are associated with
security choice.
Inclusion of SBIC characteristics
Table 7 reports the empirical
results of adding the SBIC vari-
ables to the specification.  The
addition of SBIC-specific vari-
ables has very little qualitative
impact on the estimated coeffi-
cients on firm characteristics,
including age, size, organizational





FIRMAGE 0.0401* 0.0044 0.0159
(FIRMAGE)2 / 100 –0.0384* 0.0074 –0.0152
E1–49 0.4683* 0.0419 0.1854
CORPORATION –1.5559* 0.1964 –0.6161
PARTNERSHIP –1.3866* 0.2217 –0.5490
SAMESTATE 0.3187* 0.0381 0.1262
USETRANS 0.3248* 0.0582 0.1286
SBICSIZE 0.1217* 0.0183 0.0482
SBICAGE 0.0109 0.0096 0.0043
(SBICAGE)2 / 100 –0.0160 0.0298 –0.0063
SBICCORP   0.1241* 0.0449 0.0491
SBAPRIV 0.2527* 0.0216 0.1007
SBICROA –0.8160* 0.1029 –0.3231
SBICBANK –0.2310* 0.0548 –0.0915
Number of observations 5,881
Log likelihood –3,082.79
*Indicates significance at the 5 percent level.
Notes: The “Marginal prob” column presents the marginal effects of the
right–hand–side variables (X) on the probability of debt, computed at the
mean values of X.  Sample consists of all transactions over the 1986–91
period for which complete data are available.  See table 5 for variable
definitions.  Sector and year indicator variables were included but are not
reported in the table.
Source:  Authors’ calculations from data provided by the U.S. Small
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structure, intended use, and industry classifica-
tion variables.  Intended use of funds still has a
strong positive effect on the probability of debt
usage, with transaction-oriented uses more
likely to be debt financed than other types of
projects.  Several of the SBIC-specific vari-
ables have a statistically significant impact on
the probability of debt financing.  For exam-
ple, larger SBICs are more likely to do debt
financings than smaller ones, and SBICs with
higher SBA leverage are more likely to do debt
financings than other investment companies.
Bank-affiliated investment companies (SBIC-
BANK) are significantly less likely to do debt
fundings (negative coefficient).  Being bank-
affiliated lowers the probability that an SBIC
will do a debt funding by 9 percentage points.
Being a partnership raises the probability of
providing nondebt financing by about 5 percent-
age points, compared to a corporation.  More
profitable investment companies (SBICROA)
tend to provide nondebt financing.
Inclusion of COMPUSTAT variables
Table 8 reports the empirical results when
the COMPUSTAT variables are added to the
specification.  The addition of industry-specific
variables has very little qualitative impact on
the estimated coefficients on small firm- and
SBIC-specific variables, most of which main-
tain their significance.  Firms in industries with
relatively high IND-MV/BV ratios have a
greater chance of receiving nondebt financing
than other companies.  This result
is consistent with the idea that
firms with more growth opportu-
nities generally receive more
equity financing than others,
since potential agency costs asso-
ciated with firms’ investment
behavior rise with growth oppor-
tunities.  Liquidity considerations
are important in the choice of
financing instruments.  Firms in
industries with relatively high
ratios of current assets to total
assets (IND-LIQ) tend to have a
lower probability of receiving
debt financing, suggesting that it
may be measuring the extent of
growth opportunities in the indus-
try that is not captured by IND-
MV/BV.  Firms in industries with
more volatile ROA (IND-SROA)
have a lower chance of receiving
debt financing than other compa-
nies.  This result is in line with
the view that there is a greater
risk of firms in industries with
more volatile earnings being
unable to meet their debt obliga-
tions; as a result, such firms are
more likely to receive nondebt
financing.
Firms in R&D intensive
industries are more likely to re-
ceive nondebt financing than
other firms.  R&D intensive in-
dustries are likely to accumulate
physical and intellectual capital
Security choice using small firm, investment




FIRMAGE 0.0427* 0.0044 0.0169
(FIRMAGE)2 / 100 –0.0415* 0.0074 –0.0164
E1–49 0.4725* 0.0442 0.1871
CORPORATION –1.5096* 0.1969 –0.5977
PARTNERSHIP –1.3902* 0.2223 –0.5504
SAMESTATE 0.3183* 0.0384 0.1260
USETRANS 0.2444* 0.0597 0.0968
SBICSIZE 0.1343* 0.0185 0.0532
SBICAGE 0.0056 0.0097 0.0022
(SBICAGE)2 / 100 0.0033 0.0301 0.0013
SBICCORP 0.1031* 0.0453 0.0408
SBAPRIV 0.2309* 0.0219 0.0914
SBICROA –0.8275* 0.1036 –0.3276
SBICBANK –0.2509* 0.0554 –0.0993
IND-R&D –0.0135 0.0074 –0.0053
IND-MV/BV –0.0242* 0.0059 –0.0096
IND-LIQ –1.2457* 0.1800 –0.4932
IND-ROA –0.0023  0.0033 –0.0009
IND-SROA –0.0234* 0.0080 –0.0093
IND-INTAN 1.4979* 0.6419 0.5930
Number of observations 5,881
Log likelihood –3,029.64
*Indicates significance at the 5 percent level.
Notes: The “Marginal prob” column presents the marginal effects of the
right–hand–side variables (X) on the probability of debt, computed at the
mean values of X.  Sample consists of all transactions over the 1986–91
period for which complete data are available.  See table 5 for variable
definitions.  Sector and year indicator variables were included but are not
reported in the table.
Sources: Authors’ calculations from data provided by the U.S. Small
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that is very industry- and firm-specific.  As
asset specificity increases, so do expected
agency costs in liquidation.  Hence, consistent
with the predictions of contracting theory,
firms in R&D intensive industries are more
likely to receive nondebt financing.  However,
our results also indicate that firms in industries
with more intangible assets are more likely to
receive debt than nondebt financing.  This
result is surprising.  We believe it may be due
to the flow nature of our data:  A firm’s securi-
ty choice in a particular transaction may be
more closely related to the asset being funded
by that transaction than the composition of the
firm’s stock of assets.
Conclusion
In this article, we use a unique transactions-
level dataset of small business financing to
examine how firms and investment companies
decide on the types of security used to finance
firms’ investment projects.  Our result shows
that there is a strong, positive association be-
tween the incidence of using debt to fund a
small business and using the funds to finance a
project likely to generate tangible assets.  This
relationship shows through our simple frequen-
cy tables, as well as our probit analyses of
security choice.  Thus, we find that business
projects that are likely to generate tangible
assets and allow little management discretion
tend to be funded with debt rather than equity.
This result is consistent with the contracting
theory view of the firm, which suggests that
the security choice of investors and firms is
designed to minimize their costs of contracting.
We also find that younger firms are more
likely to obtain nondebt than debt financing.
This effect conforms with standard theories on
capital structure choice, which suggest that
young firms with little reputational capital may
take on riskier projects and have more growth
opportunities than older ones.  These agency
concerns create incentives for investment com-
panies to provide nondebt rather than debt
financing to young firms.  In addition, we find
that smaller firms are more likely to receive
debt financing than larger firms.  Although this
result appears to conflict with the predictions
of contracting theory, it may be explained
partially by the fact that larger firms in our
sample may have alternative, non-SBIC sourc-
es for credit.  The private placement of debt
with SBICs by the smallest firms in our sample
may indicate that SBICs offer a funding oppor-
tunity for these firms.  The results also demon-
strate that lower market to book ratios and
R&D intensities are associated with a greater
chance of receiving debt rather than nondebt
financing.  This is because the agency cost of
debt is likely to be lower; and the investment
companies can monitor owner/managers easily.
Further, we find that characteristics of the
funding SBIC and the recipient firm’s industry
affect security choice.  In particular, SBICs
using a higher amount of funds and guarantees
from the SBA tend to be more likely to do debt
than nondebt financing.  In addition, SBICs
affiliated with banking organizations and those
organized as partnerships are more likely to
provide nondebt financings.  These results
suggest that multiple agency relationships of
investors may affect how they fund firms.
We plan to extend our work in at least two
directions.  The first is motivated by previous
research and certain features of our dataset.
We have information on whether each financ-
ing transaction in our dataset is the first such
transaction between a particular SBIC and
small firm, or whether it is a repeat transac-
tion; we can also identify transactions that
involve two or more SBICs simultaneously.
We intend to examine these transaction charac-
teristics to determine whether the relationships
we identified here remain intact, since previous
research indicates that the terms and even
availability of credit for small businesses can
vary with the strength of the relationship be-
tween lender and borrower (Petersen and Rajan,
1994; Berger and Udell, 1995).
The second extension of this work will be
to model the financing policy of small firms in
conjunction with their other policies.  For in-
stance, we find that project choice is signifi-
cantly correlated with financing choice.  How-
ever, since a firm’s project choice is likely to
be made simultaneously with the financing
arrangements, both project choice and security
choice are likely to be endogenous.  Develop-
ing and testing a structural model along these
lines remains a topic for future research.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 17
NOTES
1Empirical evidence suggests that information asymme-
tries are generally important in determining firms’ finan-
cial policies.  However, because firms place their debt
and/or equity securities privately with the SBICs and do
not issue them in public markets, and because SBICs tend
to get involved in the management of the companies they
finance, we focus on agency theory explanations of
security choice.
2For an excellent review of the agency theory and asym-
metric information literature, see Harris and Raviv (1992).
3The liquidation value of a firm is also related to how
specific its assets are to that firm or sector.  Firms with
assets that are highly industry- and firm-specific would
use less debt because the liquidation value of these assets
is substantially reduced.
4On the other hand, if the current profitability of a firm is
an indication of its investment and growth opportunities,
then more profitable firms may choose equity over debt
financing.
5For a more detailed discussion of bank- versus nonbank-
owned SBICs, see Brewer and Genay (1994) and Brewer,
Genay, Jackson, and Worthington (1996).
6Specifically, the financial statements pertain to the fiscal
years 1987–92.
7A similar table, with the share of dollars devoted to debt
and nondebt funding, is available on request.
8This is an example of how the flow nature of our data
forces us to be careful when comparing our numbers to
those of other studies.
9For comparison, we note that these three sectors account-
ed for 71.3 percent of total U.S. nonfarm payroll employ-
ment growth between 1983 and 1992, with the services
and retail trade sectors accounting for all of it:  Manufac-
turing employment actually fell modestly over this period.
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